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THE EFFECT OF COMMERCIAL PRACTICE 





CURRENT regulatory policy toward the business practices of optome- 
trists is based on the assumption that the market fails because (1) consum- 
ers are faced with the dilemma of selecting an optometrist without the 
benefit of full information on the quality of goods and services provided 
by available optometrists and (2) some optometrists exploit this asym- 
metric information between consumers and sellers by lowering quality. 
This assumption has led to the inference that regulation of optometrists' 
production and information dissemination processes is necessary to pro- 
tect consumers from their own purchase decisions and from unfair seller 
behavior. Examples of current commercial practice regulations include 
state restrictions on (1) the employment of optometrists by nonprofes- 
sional corporations,' (2) the permissible locations of optometrists' offices, 
(3) the operation of multiple offices by optometrists, and (4) the use of 
trade names by optometrists employed by nonprofessional corporations. 
Although there is theoretical support for the argument that asymmetric 
consumer information about product quality will result in market failure,2 
* I would like to thank Dennis Carlton, Richard Gilbert, Theodore Keeler, John Kush- 
man, Richard Scheffler, Lawrence Wilson, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. 
Also I would like to thank the U.S. Federal Trade Commission for generously providing part 
of the data base. 
Professional corporations differ from nonprofessional corporations in that professional 
corporation law requires each stockholder of a professional corporation to be a licensed 
member of the profession for which the corporation is organized to practice. See, generally, 
Seymour L. Coblens, Optometry and the Law (1976). 
2 For example, George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and 
the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. Econ. 488 (1970); Hayne E. Leland, Quacks, Lemons, and 
Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality Standards, 87 J. Pol. Econ. 1328 (1979); Richard 
[Journal of Law & Economics, vol. XXIX (April 1986)] 
? 1986 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0022-2186/86/2901-0007$01.50 
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the commercial practice restrictions imposed on optometrists are increas- 
ingly being perceived as a means to serve some optometrists' self- 
interests rather than the "public interest." The Federal Trade Commis- 
sion (FTC) has argued that state restrictions on employment, location, 
branch offices, and trade names serve some optometrists' self-interests by 
restricting the growth of high-volume, chain vision-care outlets.3 Further 
restrictions on optometrists' advertising have been shown to increase the 
price of ophthalmic goods and services4 and to increase price without 
increasing quality.5 
While a large body of empirical evidence exists on the effect of adver- 
tising restrictions, little empirical evidence exists on the effects of other 
commercial practice restrictions, such as the employment, location, 
branch office, and trade name restrictions. Benham and Benham and the 
FTC estimated the effect of the degree of professional control;6 however, 
neither study measured professional control on the basis of the extent of 
state commercial practice restrictions. Benham and Benham measured 
professional control as (1) the proportion of optometrists within each state 
belonging to the American Optometric Association (AOA), (2) the market 
share of large chain optical firms, and (3) the assessment of five represen- 
tatives of large chain optical firms of the "difficulty which a commercial 
firm has entering and operating in a state for reasons other than competi- 
tion with existing commercial firms."7 The FTC measured professional 
control as the presence or absence of chain optical firms employing op- 
tometrists and as the type of media advertising observed in the area.8 
Both the Benhams' and the FTC's studies are subject to the problem of 
Schmalensee, A Model of Advertising and Product Quality, 86 J. Pol. Econ. 485 (1978); 
Dennis E. Smallwood & John Conlisk, Product Quality in Markets Where Consumers Are 
Imperfectly Informed, 93 Q. J. Econ. 1 (1979); and Charles Stuart, Consumer Protection in 
Markets with Informationally Weak Buyers, 12 Bell J. Econ. 562 (1981). 
3 Federal Trade Commission, State Restrictions on Vision Care Providers: The Effects on 
Consumers ("Eyeglasses II") (July 1980). 
4 For example, Lee Benham, The Effect of Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses, 15 J. 
Law & Econ. 337 (1972). 
5 For example, Federal Trade Commission, Effects of Restrictions on Advertising and 
Commercial Practice in the Professions: The Case of Optometry (September 1980); Roger 
Feldman & James W. Begun, The Effects of Advertising: Lessons from Optometry, 13 J. 
Hum. Resources 247 (Suppl. 1978); and John E. Kwoka, Advertising and the Price and 
Quality of Optometric Services, 74 Am. Econ. Rev. 211 (1984). 
6 Lee Benham & Alexandra Benham, Regulating through the Professions: A Perspective 
on Information Control, 18 J. Law & Econ. 421 (1975); and Federal Trade Commission, 
supra note 5. 
7 Benham & Benham, supra note 6, at 426-27. 
8 Federal Trade Commission, supra note 5, at 2. 
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TABLE 1 
CLASSIFICATION PROBLEMS IN EARLIER STUDIES 
Number of Pearle 
Standard Vision Center/ 
Metropolitan FTC Benham & Texas State 
Statistical Classification of Benham Optical Stores 
Areas Restrictiveness* Classificationt by State, 1983 
Knoxville, Tenn. Most Restrictive 27 
Little Rock, Ark. Most Restrictive 13 
Providence, R.I. Most Not included 2 
Columbia, S.C. Next most Restrictive 15 
Greensboro, N.C. Next most Restrictive 18 
Milwaukee Next most Other 11 
Portland, Or. Next least Other 0 
Columbus, Ohio Next least Nonrestrictive 24 
Baltimore Least Nonrestrictive 34 
Washington, D.C. Least Nonrestrictive 1 
Seattle Least Other 5 
Minneapolis Least Nonrestrictive 20 
SouRcEs.-Federal Trade Commission, Effects of Restrictions on Advertising and Commercial Practice 
in the Professions: The Case of Optometry 41, table 2-1 (September 1980). Lee Benham & Alexandra 
Benham, Regulating through the Professions: A Perspective on Information Control, 18 J. Law & Econ. 
421, 426-27 n.14 (1975). Pearle Health Services, Inc., Prospectus 12 (September 16, 1983). 
* A Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) was classified as "most restrictive" if chain firms 
and advertising were not observed, as "next most restrictive" if nonprice advertising of eyeglasses was 
observed, as "next least restrictive" if nonprice advertising of eyeglasses and exams and chain firms were 
observed, and as "least restrictive" if price advertising of eyeglasses and chain firms were observed. 
t A state was classified as "restrictive" if at least one representative of the commercial firms surveyed 
included it among the most difficult states and as "nonrestrictive" if at least one respondent included it 
among the least difficult states. The remaining states were designated as "other." 
errors in variables. Certain states that are classified laissez-faire may 
actually be restrictive, and certain states classified as highly restrictive 
may be less restrictive.9 Table 1 shows that states included by the 
Benhams in the most restrictive category are not included in the FTC's 
most restrictive category. And each study classifies states as least restric- 
tive that the other study does not.10 Further, there is a weak relationship 
between both the Benhams' and the FTC's classifications of markets by 
9 For example, the FTC classified Seattle as least restrictive, yet optometrists in Wash- 
ington State are subject to three commercial practice restrictions, namely, the employment 
restriction by court order, the location restriction by state board regulation, and the trade 
name restriction by statute. Little Rock, Arkansas, was classified as riost restrictive, yet 
optometrists in Arkansas are subject to only the employment restriction. Benham & 
Benham, supra note 6, at 426. 
'o The Benhams mention in a footnote that even the five representatives of the large 
commercial firms did not always agree on which states should be included in the restrictive 
and nonrestrictive categories. Benham & Benham, supra note 6, at 426. 
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restrictiveness and the presence of commercial optical firms, measured as 
the number of retail optical stores operated or franchised by Pearle Health 
Services, the largest retailer of ophthalmic goods and services in the 
United States. 1 
This study does not attempt to classify states by restrictiveness and, as 
a result, is not plagued by a similar errors-in-variables problem. This 
paper estimates the effect of the presence of specific commercial practice 
restrictions. The restriction is present in a state if it is imposed by state 
statute, board of optometry regulation, court decision, or attorney general 
opinion.12 The effects of the restrictions will depend on enforcement, but 
measurement of the presence of restrictions by state does not.13 
Accordingly, after a brief description of the market for ophthalmic 
goods and services and an analysis of the commercial practice restric- 
tions, this paper presents an econometric study of the economic effect of 
the employment, location, branch office, and trade name restrictions. In 
particular, the effects of these restrictions on the price and quality of eye 
examinations and eyeglasses provided by optometrists are analyzed in 
markets characterized by different levels of consumer information and 
entry barriers. Further, this research provides a preliminary test of a 
recent amendment to the economic theory of regulation-that the regula- 
tory process can be used as a strategic weapon by subgroups of firms 
within an industry against other subgroups within that industry. 
II. THE MARKET FOR OPHTHALMIC GOODS AND SERVICES 
Most optometrists are self-employed; however, the market share of lay- 
employed optometrists (optometrists employed by drug and department 
stores and other nonprofessional optical firms) is increasing. In 1977, 80 
" This is due in part to the difference between the FTC's classification criteria, the 
presence of optical firms employing optometrists, and Pearle Health Service's marketing 
strategy. "The Companies' marketing strategy is premised upon the availability of op- 
tometric services at or near the location of the retail optical store. ... In nine states of the 
United States, the Company employs optometrists to provide eye examinations and related 
services. In most other jurisdictions in which the Company operates stores, the Company 
leases space adjacent to the retail optical store to an optometrist who provides these ser- 
vices." Pearle Health Services, Inc., Prospectus, 11-13 (September 16, 1983). 
12 Certain state optometric associations' rules of practice and codes of ethics also suggest 
ways to establish and maintain one's practice; however, the private association's only 
enforcement mechanism is expulsion from membership. Many optometrists choose not to 
belong in the first place. 
13 The commercial practice restriction data were obtained from the July 1980 FTC report 
("Eyeglasses II") and then cross-checked with the state optometry laws listed in the 1978 
Blue Book of Optometrists. A further check was made by writing to each state board of 
optometry and state optometric association. 
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percent of all optometrists were self-employed, 4 percent were employed 
by professional corporations, 2 percent by nonprofessional corporations, 
and 14 percent by the government, other optometrists, or ophthalmolo- 
gists.14 Between 1973 and 1984 the market share of optical chain firms 
increased from 3 to 15 percent in the market for eye examinations and 
from 7 to 20 percent in the market for eye wear.15 
Many self-employed optometrists and optometrists employed by pro- 
fessional corporations oppose the provision of ophthalmic services by 
nonprofessional optical firms. Lay-employed optometrists, opponents ar- 
gue, may employ a variety of cost-cutting techniques, such as providing 
brief and inadequate eye examinations, in order to increase profits. Fur- 
ther, lay-employed optometrists practicing under a trade name lack per- 
sonal accountability and the need to maintain a personal reputation for 
high-quality service. Opponents also argue that the management of non- 
professional optical firms may interfere in the doctor-patient relationship 
and with professional judgments concerning patient welfare. Thus oppo- 
nents argue that commercial practice restrictions are necessary to prevent 
lay-employed optometrists from increasing their market share by selling 
services at lower prices and substituting low- for high-quality care without 
consumer recognition of this change in quality.16 
III. COMMERCIAL PRACTICE RESTRICTIONS IN OPTOMETRY 
Optometric jurisprudence is state oriented. All states and the District of 
Columbia require the licensure of optometrists. The state licensing stat- 
utes define the functions of the optometric profession and limit the perfor- 
mance of these functions to licensed persons. The state licensing statutes 
also provide for the establishment of state boards of examiners in op- 
tometry to perform licensing and regulatory functions. The state boards 
are authorized to issue rules and regulations, to define requirements for 
licensure, and to discipline persons who have violated the licensing stat- 
utes. Where state laws do not delineate specific grounds for license sus- 
pension or revocation, the state boards are usually empowered to define 
"unprofessional" or "unethical" conduct, which is grounds for license 
suspension or revocation in most states. 
This state-by-state self-regulation has resulted in wide cross-sectional 
variation in the type of commercial practice restrictions placed on op- 
14 U.S. Dep't of Health, Education, & Welfare, Bureau of Health Management, Supply of 
Optometrists in the United States, Current and Future 16 (October 1978). 
15 Pearle Health Services, Inc., Annual Report 4 (1983). 
16 See Federal Trade Commission, supra note 3, at 29-35. 
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tometrists. Table 2 shows that, in 1980, state laws, regulations, attorney 
general opinions, and court decisions existed in thirty-seven states con- 
cerning the employment of optometrists by nonprofessional firms, in 
twenty-eight states concerning the permissible locations of optometrists' 
offices, in twenty-two states concerning the number of branch offices an 
optometrist may operate, and in forty-one states concerning the ability of 
optometrists employed by nonprofessional firms to practice under a trade 
name. 
The employment restrictions usually provide that it is unprofessional 
conduct or an illegal practice for an optometrist to accept employment 
from an unlicensed person or firm. For example, the provision in the 
North Carolina statute reads: "[A]nd it shall be likewise unlawful for any 
corporation, lay body, organization, group, or lay individual to engage, or 
undertake to engage, in the practice of optometry through means of en- 
gaging the services, upon a salary or commission basis, of one licensed to 
practice optometry or medicine in any of its branches in this State. Like- 
wise, it shall be unlawful for any optometrist licensed under the provi- 
sions of this Article to undertake to engage in the practices of optometry 
as a salaried or commissioned employee of any corporation, lay body, 
organization, group, or lay individual."17 
Restrictions on location usually provide that it is unprofessional con- 
duct or an illegal practice to work in an office not devoted exclusively to 
the practice of optometry or some other health care profession or in which 
materials are displayed pertaining to a commercial undertaking not re- 
lated to the practice of optometry. For example, the provision in the 
South Carolina statute reads: "Any person registered as provided for in 
this chapter may have his certificate of registration revoked or suspended 
by the board for . . . [f]ailure to have their offices for the practice of 
optometry,... in offices separate and distinct from any business organi- 
zation, with doors leading directly to the street, or public halls leading 
directly to the street. They shall not practice or operate in or on premises 
where any material other than those necessary to render their services are 
dispensed to the public."'8 
Branch office restrictions usually set a maximum number of branch 
offices an optometrist may operate or require the optometrist to be in 
personal attendance a certain proportion of the time the office is open to 
the public. The California statute reads: "Nothing in this chapter shall 
prevent an optometrist from owning, maintaining or operating more than 
one branch office if he is in personal attendance at each of his offices fifty 
17 N.C. Admin. Code, ? 90-125. 
18 S.C. Code Ann., No. 56-1077. 
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COMMERCIAL PRACTICE RESTRICTIONS BY STATE, 1980 
Employment Location Branch Office Trade Name 
State Restriction Restriction Restriction Restriction 
Alabama S*... S S 
Alaska R R S, R R 
Arizona R ... R R, S* 
Arkansas S ... 
California S ... S R, S* 
Colorado S R ... R 
Connecticut S S R 
Delaware S, R S, R ... R 
District of Columbia 
Florida S, R R R S, R 
Georgia ... R R, C R 
Hawaii S S ... S 
Idaho S, R R R R, S* 
Illinois ... ... ... S 
Indiana S ... ... R 
Iowa C ... S* 
Kansas S, R, C ... ... S, R 
Kentucky R, C ... S, R S 
Louisiana C 
Maine S S S S 
Maryland S* . 
Massachusetts S R R, A S, R 
Michigan S* ...... R 
Minnesota A, S* . . 
Mississippi R, C, A R R R 
Missouri ... R ... S 
Montana S R ... R, S* 
Nebraska ... 
Nevada S S, R ... R 
New Hampshire S R . 
New Jersey S, R S C S 
New MexicoS ... ... S 
New York C ... ... R 
North Carolina S R R S 
North Dakota S ... ... R 
Ohio R, C ... A R 
Oklahoma S S, R R S 
Oregon ... .. R S* 
Pennsylvania R R R, S* R 
Rhode Island S S ... S, R 
South Carolina ... S, R R S, R 
South Dakota S, S* R ... S, R 
Tennessee S S S S 
TexasS* S S S 
Utah C R ... S 
Vermont A ... S R, S* 
Virginia S, R S ... S, R 
Washington C R ... S* 
West Virginia R, S S ... S, R 
WisconsinS* ...... 
Wyoming S* ...... 
SOURCE.-Federal Trade Commission, State Restrictions on Vision Care Providers: The Effects on 
Consumers ("Eyeglasses II") 28 (July 1980). 
NOTE.-C = court decision, S = statutory restriction, S* = ambiguous statute, A = attorney general 
opinion, and R = state board regulation. 
THE JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 
percent (50%) of the time during which such office is open for the practice 
of optometry."19 
Trade name restrictions usually provide that an optometrist's license to 
practice may be revoked or suspended for practicing under a name other 
than his or her own name or under a false or assumed name. However, 
trade name restrictions 
generally do not prevent an optometrist from working for another optometrist and 
holding him or herself out under the name of the professional corporation. Thus, 
these restrictions have a distinct discriminatory impact on non-professional cor- 
porations. (The discriminatory impact here is not that a professional corporation 
is able to use a traditional trade name but rather that an individual optometrist can 
hold him or herself out under a firm name which does not contain his or her 
individual name so long as that firm is a professional corporation or the name of a 
licensed optometrist who employs that individual optometrist.)20 
The existence of commercial practice restrictions in the market for 
ophthalmic services is consistent with the economic theory of regulation 
and with recent literature on strategic use of the regulatory process by 
subgroups of firms within an industry. According to the economic theory 
of regulation, regulation can be used as a device for transferring income 
from groups with less political power to groups with more, usually from 
consumers to the politically powerful regulated industry.21 Firms in the 
regulated industry are assumed to be homogeneous and therefore equally 
benefited by the regulation and equally interested in promoting the regula- 
tion. 
Recently, the economic theory of regulation has been extended to in- 
clude heterogeneous firms and thus the idea that regulations impose dif- 
ferent benefits and costs on firms within the industry.22 Assuming that 
heterogeneous firms form subgroups,23 regulation can be viewed as a 
19 Cal. [Bus. & Prof.] Code ? 3007(i) (Deering). 
20 Federal Trade Commission, supra note 3, at 23-24. 
21 See Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. Law & Econ. 
211 (1976); Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. 
Sci. 335 (1974); and George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J. Econ. 
& Mgmt. Sci. 3 (1971). 
22 See Michael T. Maloney & Robert E. McCormick, A Positive Theory of Environmental 
Quality Regulation, 25 J. Law & Econ. 99 (1982); Sharon Oster, The Strategic Use of 
Regulatory Investment by Industry Sub-groups, 20 Econ. Inquiry 604 (1982); and Steven C. 
Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals' Costs, 73 Am. Econ. Rev. 267 (1983). 
23 See Richard E. Caves & Michael E. Porter, From Entry Barriers to Mobility Barriers: 
Conjectural Decisions and Contrived Deterrence to New Competition, 91 Q. J. Econ. 421 
(1977); Howard H. Newman, Strategic Groups and the Structure-Performance Relationship, 
60 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 417 (1978); and Michael E. Porter, The Structure within Industries 
and Companies' Performance, 61 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 214 (1979). 
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device for transferring income from subgroups of firms with less political 
power to those with more. Politically powerful firms can use the regula- 
tory process as a strategic weapon against other groups of firms within the 
industry. Oster wrote, "As long as there is some initial difference among 
firms in an industry, different firms in that industry may push for regula- 
tions which increase the relative rate of return to their peculiar character- 
istics. ... [T]he firm may even encourage a regulation which lowers its 
short-term profits if that regulation simultaneously reduces the ability of 
its rival to compete effectively."24 
Salop and Scheffman make a more general argument and mention regu- 
lation as one way to increase rivals' costs: "It is better to compete against 
high-cost firms than low-cost ones. Thus, raising rivals' costs can be 
profitable even if the rival does not exit from the market. ... A higher- 
cost rival quickly reduces output, allowing the predator to immediately 
raise price or market share."25 
Strategic use of the regulatory process is quite possible in the 
ophthalmic industry. Optometrists regulate themselves,26 and the op- 
tometrists appointed to the state regulatory boards are not appointed at 
random. Board members in forty-six states are appointed by the governor 
from lists of optometrists who have practiced optometry in the state for a 
specified number of years. In sixteen states, the optometry statutes desig- 
nate membership in the state optometric association as a prerequisite for 
appointment, or they require the governor to make appointments from 
lists submitted by the state optometric association.27 Further, the industry 
consists of differentiated subgroups of firms. Size, marketing strategy, 
and level of vertical integration differentiate self-employed optometrists 
from lay-employed optometrists. 
IV. THE ECONOMIC EFFECT OF COMMERCIAL PRACTICE RESTRICTIONS 
The employment restriction prevents nonprofessional optical firms 
from employing optometrists and therefore from selling eye examinations 
and eyeglass prescriptions (that is, offering the one-stop service of dis- 
24 Oster, supra note 22, at 606. 
25 Salop & Scheffman, supra note 22, at 267. 
26 The state optometric boards are composed entirely of optometrists in twenty-six states 
and the District of Columbia: twelve states require only one lay member, eleven states 
require only two lay members, and California requires three lay members on the board. 
Council of State Governments, Health Licensure Boards: Public Membership (1981), at 
table 1. 
27 Federal Trade Commission, Staff Report on Advertising of Ophthalmic Goods and 
Services and Proposed Trade Regulation Rule (16 CFR Part 456) 34-35 (May 1977). 
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pensing optometrists). To the extent that there are economies of scope in 
the joint production of eye examinations and eyeglasses, the employment 
restriction forces nonprofessional optical firms to incur the higher cost of 
producing eyeglasses alone. Thus the employment restriction may deter 
entry by potential nonprofessional optical firms. However, the employ- 
ment restriction does not prevent the nonprofessional firm from locating 
close to an optometrist. 
The trade name restriction prevents lay-employed optometrists from 
including trade names in their advertising. Since consumers can use trade 
names as a substitute for search or as an aid in processing information 
about different sellers, the trade name restriction decreases the effec- 
tiveness of advertising by nonprofessional optical firms. This may reduce 
the ability of nonprofessional optical firms to attract new customers and 
realize scale economies. Like the employment restriction, the trade name 
restriction may also deter entry by potential nonprofessional optical 
firms. 
The location restriction prevents self-employed and lay-employed op- 
tometrists from locating in high-traffic, high-visibility areas such as shop- 
ping centers and department stores. This reduces the ability of all op- 
tometrists to develop high-volume practices and realize economies of 
scale. Lay-employed optometrists, however, tend to rely more heavily 
than self-employed optometrists on convenient locations to attract cus- 
tomers.28 Therefore, lay-employed optometrists are more likely to be con- 
strained by the location restriction. 
The branch office restriction prevents self-employed and lay-employed 
optometrists from expanding their practices by opening new offices. To 
the extent the branch office regulation is binding, optometrists are pre- 
vented from utilizing the cost-minimizing combination of inputs. With 
data from the dental industry, DeVany, Gramm, Saving, and Smithson29 
show that input regulation increases the ratio of unrestricted to restricted 
inputs. 
The preceding discussion focuses on the commercial practice restric- 
tions' effects on self- and lay-employed optometrists' production costs. 
Two of the four restrictions, the employment and trade name restrictions, 
may increase the costs of production for lay-employed optometrists. The 
28 Support for this suggestion is found in the Prospectus of Pearle Health Services, Inc. 
"They [retail stores] are generally located in high traffic areas convenient to customers, 
typically in shopping malls, strip shopping centers or freestanding buildings in major shop- 
ping areas." Pearle Health Services, Inc., supra note 11 at 11. 
29 Arthur S. DeVany, Wendy L. Gramm, Thomas R. Saving, & Charles W. Smithson, 
The Impact of Input Regulation: The Case of the U.S. Dental Industry, 25 J. Law & Econ. 
367 (1982). 
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location and branch office restrictions may increase the costs of produc- 
tion for self-employed and lay-employed optometrists; however, it can be 
argued that the location and branch office restrictions differentially dam- 
age lay-employed optometrists. In addition, the analysis suggests that the 
restrictions may deter entry by nonprofessional optical firms.30 The ex- 
pected result, if this is true, is higher prices. 
The hypothesis to be tested, then, is that the commercial practice re- 
strictions have tended to increase eye examination and eyeglass prices. 
However, the major justification for the restrictions is elimination of low- 
quality services. Accordingly, the empirical analysis also examines the 
effect of the restrictions on quality. A hedonic regression is estimated to 
test the effects of the restrictions on quality-adjusted price. The quality- 
adjusted price is defined as the price of an eye examination and pair of 
eyeglasses of a given quality and is revealed to consumers from observed 
prices of eye examinations and eyeglasses and the level of quality associ- 
ated with them. 
V. THE MODEL 
When information is costly, the relevant market structure is monop- 
olistic competition rather than perfect competition.31 Accordingly, the 
ophthalmic industry is modeled as a monopolistically competitive indus- 
try.32 
Assuming optometrists choose price and quality jointly, the quality- 
adjusted price, QUALP/, charged by optometrist j is a function of op- 
tometrist j's marginal cost, MCJ, and price elasticity of demand, e,: 
QUALPj = f[MCi(INPUT, R-EMPLOY, R-LOCATE, 
R-BRANCH, R-TN), ej(Aj, AD, OPTOM)], 
where INPUT is the price of inputs, R-EMPLOY is the employment 
restriction, R-LOCATE is the location restriction, R-BRANCH is the 
branch office restriction, R-TN is the trade name restriction, A, is the 
3) Support for this suggestion is found in the Prospectus of Pearie Health Services, Inc. 
"Management believes that these efforts [Federal Trade Commission proceedings that may 
result in rules that would preempt restrictions], if successful, would facilitate increased 
market penetration by the Company in those jurisdictions." Pearle Health Services, Inc., 
supra note 11, at 16. 
31 See Steven Salop, Information and Monopolistic Competition, 66 Am. Econ. Rev. 240 
(1976). 
32 See also Mark V. Pauly & Mark A. Satterthwaite, The Pricing of Primary Care Physi- 
cians' Services: A Test of the Role of Consumer Information, 12 Bell J. Econ. 488 (1981). 
Pauly and Satterthwaite classify the market for primary medical care as monopolistically 
competitive "because physicians are price setters and metropolitan areas contain sufficient 
numbers of competitive physicians to eliminate oligopolistic interactions." Id. at 489. 
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level of advertising chosen by optometrist j, AD is competitors' advertis- 
ing expenditures, and OPTOM is the number of optometrists in the mar- 
ket area. As discussed earlier, R-EMPLOY and R-TN may increase costs 
for lay-employed optometrists, and R-LOCATE and R-BRANCH may 
increase costs for self- and lay-employed optometrists. The price elastic- 
ity of demand depends on the number of sellers33 and the level of advertis- 
ing.34 Further, it is expected that GQUALPj/8MCj > 0, GQUALPj/Gej < 0, 
and ?MCi/8INPUT > 0. 
Not all optometrists decide to advertise. The advertising choice of op- 
tometristj is assumed to be a function of QUALPj,35 competitors' adver- 
tising expenditures,36 and the trade name restriction: 
Aj = g(QUALPj, AD, R-TN). (2) 
The signs of all three variables are ambiguous. For example, R-TN makes 
advertising by lay-employed optometrists less effective. As a result, the 
lay-employed optometrist may decide to advertise less or may decide to 
advertise more to compensate for less-effective advertising messages. 
Professionals' location decisions depend on demand for their services, 
measured as per capita income,37 state licensure requirements,38 the sup- 
ply of competing professionals,39 and the regulatory environment.40 Ac- 
cordingly, it is assumed that the number of self- and lay-employed op- 
tometrists is a function of per capita income, Y, the difficulty of the state 
licensing examination, EXAM, the supply of opticians, OPTIC, and the 
four commercial practice restrictions: 
OPTOM = b(Y, EXAM, OPTIC, R-EMPLOY, (3) 
R-LOCATE, R-BRANCH, R-TN). 
33 Pauly & Satterthwaite, supra note 32. 
34 See, for example, Phillip Nelson, Advertising as Information, 81 J. Pol. Econ. 729 
(1974). 
35 See, for example, Richard E. Kihlstrom & Michael H. Riordan, Advertising as a Signal, 
92 J. Pol. Econ. 427 (1984); and Nelson, supra note 34. 
36 See Michael Waterson, Economic Theory of Industry 131 (1984). 
37 See, for example, L. Benham, A. Maurizi, & M. W. Reder, Migration, Location and 
Remuneration of Medical Personnel: Physicians and Dentists, 50 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 332 
(1968); and Alfred Meltzer, Kathryn Langwell, Michael Keane, & Shelly Nelson, Report on 
the Geographic Distribution of Vision Care Providers (unpublished report, Applied Manage- 
ment Sciences, Inc., 1983). 
38 See, for example, Benham, Maurizi, & Reder, supra note 37; and H. E. Frech III, 
Occupational Licensure and Health Care Productivity: The Issues and the Literature, in 
Health Manpower and Productivity: The Literature and Required Future Research (John 
Rafferty ed. 1974). 
39 See, for example, Meltzer, Langwell, Keane, & Nelson, supra note 37. 
40 See, for example, id. 
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It is expected that 8OPTOM/ Y > 0, GOPTOM/8OPTIC < 0, and 
GOPTOM/8EXAM < 0. As discussed earlier, R-EMPLOY and R-TN may 
deter entry by lay-employed optometrists, and R-LOCATE and R- 
BRANCH may deter entry by self- and lay-employed optometrists. 
From equations (1), (2) and (3), quality-adjusted price, advertising, and 
number of optometrists are simultaneously determined by AD and eight 
exogenous variables.41 Competitors' advertising expenditures are endoge- 
nous, so an instrumental variable, the presence or absence of media ad- 
vertising by optometrists in the market, ADVERT, is used in the estima- 
tion of equation (4). The state commercial practice restrictions may affect 
the level of optometrists' advertising expenditures but not whether op- 
tometrists choose to advertise in that state. The 1977 Supreme Court 
ruling in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona allows professionals, regardless of 
their state's statutes, to advertise.42 Accordingly, the effects of the com- 
mercial practice restrictions on quality-adjusted price are estimated using 
the following equation: 
QUALPj = h(ADVERT, R-EMPLOY, R-LOCATE, 
R-BRANCH, R-TN, EXAM, OPTIC, (4) 
Y, INPUT). 
VI. THE DATA 
The data sources and the means and standard deviations of the vari- 
ables are listed in Table 3. Data on the price, quality, and advertising of 
ophthalmic goods and services were derived from an FTC data set, which 
includes data on the price and quality of eye examinations and eyeglasses 
purchased from 280 optometrists in twelve Standard Metropolitan Statis- 
tical Areas (SMSAs).43 To collect the data the FTC trained nineteen pro- 
fessional survey interviewers to identify the procedures and equipment 
used in eye examinations44 and then sent the interviewers to optometrists' 
41 The state commercial practice restrictions may also be endogenous. For a detailed 
discussion, see J. Begun, E. Crowe, & R. Feldman, Occupational Regulation in the States: 
A Causal Model, 6 J. Health Pol., Pol'y, & L. 229 (1981). Endogeneity of the restrictions, 
however, will entail only a small bias in the ordinary least squares estimators if the variance 
of the errors is small relative to the variance of the regulatory variables. See, for example, 
G. S. Maddala, Econometrics 153 (1977). 
42 Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
43 Baltimore; Columbia, South Carolina; Columbus, Ohio; Greensboro-Highpoint- 
Winston-Salem, North Carolina; Knoxville, Tennessee; Little Rock, Arkansas; Milwaukee; 
Minneapolis-St. Paul; Portland, Oregon; Providence, Rhode Island; Seattle; and Washing- 
ton, D.C. 
44 During the training period, the interviewers were also given eye examinations so there 
would be independent opinions regarding the corrective lenses each subject required for 
proper vision. 
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TABLE 3 
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF VARIABLES 
Standard 
Variable Definition Mean Deviation 
PRICE Price of exam and 79.58 13.51 
glasses 
THOROUGH Thoroughness of exam 57.56 20.96 
ACPRESC Accuracy of prescrip- .83 .37 
tion 
ADVERT Media advertising ob- .78 .41 
served 
R-TN Trade name restriction .52 .50 
R-LOCATE Location restriction .38 .49 
R-BRANCH Branch office restric- .27 .45 
tion 
R-EMPLOY Employment restriction .52 .50 
EXAM Subjects in licensing 10.53 4.05 
exam 
OPTIC Optician/population 7.12 4.42 
ratio 
Y Per capita income 8438.78 992.28 
INPUT Hourly wage rate- 4.06 .64 
manufacturing 
SOURCES.-P, THOROUGH, ACPRESC, and ADVERT computed from data provided by Federal 
Trade Commission, Effects of Restrictions on Advertising and Commercial Practice in the Professions: 
The Case of Optometry (September 1980); R-TN, R-LOCATE, R-BRANCH, and R-EMPLOY compiled 
from data in Federal Trade Commission, State Restrictions on Vision Care Providers: The Effects on 
Consumers ("Eyeglasses II") 28 (July 1980); EXAM compiled from data in U.S. Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare, Report to the Congress: Reimbursement under Part B of Medicare for Certain 
Services Provided by Optometrists (July 1976); OPTIC from U.S. Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare, Opticians Employed in the Health Services, U.S., 1968 (1968); Y from U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current Business (April 1981); and INPUT from 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, State and Metropolitan Area Data Book (1979). 
offices to purchase examinations and eyeglasses in November and De- 
cember 1977. The interviewers purchased the eye examinations and eye- 
glasses from 189 self-employed optometrists and ninety-one optometrists 
employed by drug and department stores and other nonprofessional opti- 
cal firms. 
Local newspapers were scanned from May 1977 to December 1977 to 
determine the extent of media advertising of eye examinations and eye- 
glasses in the twelve SMSAs.45 Media advertising was observed in nine of 
the twelve SMSAs. Optometrists were observed advertising on-site with 
either large signs or window displays in all twelve SMSAs. 
Price is measured as the sum of the price of an eye examination and 
the price of a pair of eyeglasses. The joint price is used because, when the 
45 There was no media advertising observed in Knoxville, Tennessee, Little Rock, Arkan- 
sas, and Providence, Rhode Island. 
178 
COMMERCIAL PRACTICE RESTRICTIONS 
exam and glasses are purchased as a package, it is possible that the 
itemization of charges is arbitrary. 
Quality is measured as the thoroughness of eye examination, THOR- 
OUGH, and as the accuracy of the eyeglass prescription, ACPRESC. 
Thoroughness of the eye examination is an index that measures inputs 
(procedures performed in the examination) rather than outputs (the op- 
tometrist's ability to discover all relevant information about the consum- 
er's eye health). The index, developed by Dr. Kenneth Myers (Director of 
the Optometric Service, Department of Medicine and Surgery, U.S. Vet- 
erans Administration), was constructed by weighting each test or proce- 
dure by a value proportional to its importance in the examination. 
Accuracy of the prescription is a measure of the clinical judgment of 
consultants at the State University of New York, College of Optometry, 
and at the Pennsylvania College of Optometry as to the appropriateness of 
the prescriptions. The consultants compared their opinions regarding the 
corrective lenses each subject required for proper vision with the written 
prescriptions from optometrists and then evaluated the prescriptions for 
the adequacy with which subjects' visual needs were met. 
With respect to the other independent variables, EXAM is measured as 
the number of subject areas that must be included in the state licensing 
examination, INPUT is measured as the average SMSA wage rate of 
production workers in the manufacturing sector, and OPTIC is measured 
as the ratio of opticians to 100,000 population in the state. 
VII. THE EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Equation (4) is estimated in double-log form using two specifications 
and two dependent variables. The results of regressions on price are 
reported in Table 4, while the results of regressions on quality are re- 
ported in Table 5. In the first specification the four commercial practice 
restrictions are included as dummy variables that equal one if the restric- 
tion is present in the state and zero otherwise. In the second specification 
the restrictions are included as dummy variables, and an index of the 
degree of state regulation of optometry, REG, is interacted with quality 
and media advertising. The variable REG is constructed by summing the 
dummy commercial practice restriction variables by state. This sum- 
mated scale assigns equal weight to each restriction and ranges from zero 
to four. Thus the potential interaction between quality choice and the 
restrictions and the interaction between media advertising and regulatory 
effect are included in the second specification.46 
46 Advertising may permit the realization of production scale economies that might other- 
wise be unobtainable because of market imperfections or regulation. 
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TABLE 4 
REGRESSIONS ON PRICE, HOLDING QUALITY CONSTANT 
Independent 













REG x ADVERT 
REG x THOROUGH 
- 1.4413 -.9728 -13.8777 
(.98) (.62) (3.45) 
.8082 .9557 .7107 
(2.51) (2.79) (2.23) 
.4888 .4123 1.8315 
(2.88) (2.26) (4.18) 
-.1878 -.1814 - .5065 
(6.02) (5.54) (5.02) 
.1805 .1719 .3617 
(4.80) (4.21) (5.48) 
-.3038 - .3305 .3883 
(2.59) (2.65) (1.63) 
.0607 .0182 .4362 
(.48) (.14) (2.59) 
- .0015 .0277 .0860 
(.01) (.24) (.80) 
.1545 .2177 .5687 
(1.13) (1.50) (3.14) 
-.1592 -.1330 .1624 
(4.83) (3.62) (1.59) 
.1110 .1163 .1064 
(4.59) (4.40) (4.47) 
... .0070 ... 
(.24) 



























- .0139 -.0172 
(.88) (1.11) 
NOTE.-t-statistics are in parentheses. 
* N = 280, R2 = .23. 
t N = 253, R2 = .23. 
$ N = 280, R2 = .26. 
Because of the collinearity among the commercial practice restric- 
tions,47 the individual coefficients cannot be estimated precisely; how- 
ever, the sum of the coefficients on the regulatory variables can be es- 
timated with considerable accuracy. This sum provides a reliable estimate 
of the regulatory effect.48 
47 High zero-order correlations are a sufficient but not a necessary condition for the 
existence of multicollinearity. The trade name restriction is highly correlated with the loca- 
tion, the branch office, and the employment restrictions (r = 0.82, 0.52, and 0.54, respec- 
tively). 
48 See Maddala, supra note 41, at 189. 
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TABLE 5 



































. . . 
NoTE.-t-statistics are in parentheses. 
* N = 434, R2 = .05. 
Results of ordinary least squares regressions that test the effects of the 
restrictions on price, controlling for differences in quality, are reported in 
Table 4. The coefficients on the dummy variables can be interpreted as 
percentage changes and those on the other variables as elasticities. Re- 
gression A and regressions C-E include one measure of quality, THOR- 
OUGH, while regression B includes two quality measures, THOROUGH 
and ACPRESC. Further, regression C allows for an interaction between 
the degree of state regulation of optometry and media advertising by 
optometrists; regression D allows for an interaction between the degree of 
state regulation of optometry and optometrists' quality decisions; and 
regression E allows for both interactions. 
The results are consistent with the hypothesis that state commercial 
practice restrictions increase the price of ophthalmic goods and services, 
holding quality constant. The sum of the coefficients on the regulatory 
variables in regression A suggests a positive 5.5 percent difference in the 
price of an eye examination and pair of eyeglasses in fully regulated 
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sions B-E resulted in positive 13.1, 7.3, 5.1, and 7.0 percent differences, 
respectively, in fully regulated states. In all five regressions the hy- 
pothesis that the effect of the commercial practice regulations is equal to 
zero can be rejected at the 1 percent level of significance (F = 8.14, 7.52, 
11.18, 8.33, and 11.50, respectively). 
With respect to the relationship between price and quality, the price of 
an eye examination and a pair of eyeglasses increases with the thor- 
oughness of the eye examination but not with the accuracy of the eyeglass 
prescription. A 1 percent increase in the thoroughness of the eye exami- 
nation results in a 0.11-0.12 percent increase in the price of an eye exami- 
nation and pair of eyeglasses. The coefficient on ACPRESC, however, is 
not significantly different from zero. This suggests that prices convey 
information on one aspect of product quality, thoroughness of the exami- 
nation, but prices do not convey information on a second aspect of qual- 
ity, prescription accuracy. A possible explanation of this is that consum- 
ers can assess thoroughness but not prescription accuracy. 
In all five regressions media advertising by optometrists is associated 
with lower prices, controlling for quality differences. Prices are approxi- 
mately 26.3-33.1 percent lower in markets in which price or nonprice 
media advertising by optometrists is observed. This is consistent with the 
FTC's finding that the average price charged for eyeglasses and eye exam- 
inations is $23.74 lower in markets in which price advertising and chain 
optical firms are observed.49 The coefficient on the optician-to-population 
ratio is also negative and statistically significant in all regressions. Fur- 
ther, in all five regressions more rigorous licensing examinations, higher 
per capita income, and higher input costs are associated with higher 
prices, controlling for quality differences. For example, a 1 percent in- 
crease in the number of subject areas that must be covered in the state 
licensing examination results in a 0.17-0.37 percent increase in price. 
Table 5 reports the results of ordinary least squares regressions that test 
the effects of the commercial practice restrictions on quality, measured as 
the thoroughness of the eye examination. The results suggest that quality 
is not affected by the presence of the commercial practice restrictions. In 
the first quality regression the sum of the coefficients of the commercial 
practice restrictions is - 17.8 percent, which is not significantly different 
from zero at the 1 percent level (F = 2.04). The summed coefficients of 
the commercial practice restrictions in the second quality regression 
equal -14.6 percent, again not statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level (F = 2.29). The results do not support the argument made by propo- 
49 Federal Trade Commission, supra note 5, at 4. 
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nents of the commercial practice restrictions that the restrictions will 
increase the quality of ophthalmic services. 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
In 1977 the four commercial practice restrictions appear to have in- 
creased the price of an eye examination and pair of eyeglasses by at least 
5-13 percent, holding quality constant, measured as the thoroughness of 
the eye examination and accuracy of the eyeglass prescription. And to 
reiterate, the commercial practice restrictions did not appear to increase 
the quality of ophthalmic services. These results provide support for the 
economic theory of regulation and for a recent extension of the economic 
theory of regulation, that subgroups of firms within an industry will use 
the regulatory process to increase their rivals' costs and, therefore, their 
own market power. 
Consumers paid at least $4.7 million more for eye examinations and 
eyeglasses in 1977 because of the four commercial practice restrictions.50 
Further, part of this $4.7 million is a social cost rather than an income 
transfer. Regulation-induced inefficiencies in production account for 
some of the price increase. The four commercial practice restrictions may 
inhibit optometrists' potential to realize economies of scale, the employ- 
ment restriction may inhibit nonprofessional optical firms' potential to 
realize economies of scope, and the branch office restriction may prevent 
optometrists from employing the cost-minimizing combination of inputs. 
Also the opportunity costs of resources used by optometrists to influence 
the political process to attain market power through commercial practice 
laws and regulations are social costs.51 
This paper suggests that commercial practice restrictions in the 
ophthalmic market are not protecting the consumer. The commercial 
practice restrictions increase price and have a statistically insignificant 
effect on quality. Intervention strategies should correct the market failure 
without causing serious distortions that lead to even greater consumer 
injury. 
50 This estimate is based on the four restrictions increasing price by $19, each optometrist 
providing 1,422 eye examinations and pairs of eyeglasses a year, American Optometric 
Association News, August 1, 1981; 18,589 optometrists practicing in states with trade name 
restrictions, 10,844 optometrists practicing in states with branch office restrictions, 8,613 
optometrists practicing in states with location restrictions, and 14,750 optometrists practic- 
ing in states with employment restrictions, letter from Farrell Aron, Director of Statistical 
Research, American Optometric Association, September 15, 1982. 
51 See Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. Pol. Econ. 
807 (1975). 
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